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FROM PROPERTY TO CONTRACT:
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
UNIVERSITY-PRIVATE SECTOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RELATIONSHIPS
Robert G. Bone*
I. INTRODUCTION
The subject of this Article lies at the intersection of two distinct
areas of the law-intellectual property (IP) and federal jurisdiction.
It focuses on a question made particularly salient by recent Supreme
Court decisions: What is likely to happen when federal intellectual
property rights cannot be enforced against state universities because
of Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional obstacles? This question is
especially important for transactions between private intellectual
property firms and state universities. And the answer to the question
is not nearly as obvious as many commentators suppose.
Two developments over the past twenty years frame the inquiry.
The first is the sharp increase in the number and importance of intel-
lectual property transactions between universities and private firms.
1
Some of these transactions involve simple consulting arrangements.
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I would like to
thank my colleagues, Jack Beermann and Larry Yackle, for helpful conversa-
tions about the ideas in this Article. I am also grateful to the participants in the
Loyola Federalism Symposium and the editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review for stimulating discussion and useful input. All errors, of course,
are mine.
1. See, e.g., William L. Baldwin, The U.S. Research University and the
Joint Venture: Evolution of an Institution, 11 REV. INDUS. ORG. 629, 633-37
(1996) (showing that private industry support for university research and de-
velopment has grown more rapidly than federal government support); Richard
Florida, The Role of the University: Leveraging Talent, Not Technology,
ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ONLINE (Summer 1999)
<http://www.nap.edu/issues/15.4/florida.htm>.
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Others involve more complex and institutionalized forms of collabo-
ration, such as joint ventures that combine the talents of multiple
faculty and private sector employees in the service of specific re-
search projects and university research centers funded in major part
by private industry and committed to long-term and broad-based re-
search collaboration. z
Federal policy places a high priority on this kind of research co-
operation and on the transfer of government-funded research tech-
nology to the private sector.3 In 1980, for example, Congress en-
acted the Bayh-Dole Act,4 which for the first time allowed
universities to patent government-funded research results and grant
exclusive licenses to private firms. Since 1980, the federal govern-
ment has strongly encouraged university-industry cooperation by
conditioning National Science Foundation research grants on indus-
try involvement with university research projects and creating special
funding programs, like the Advanced Technology Program, that tar-
get joint research ventures.
5
The second development that frames the subject of this Article
is the United States Supreme Court's increasingly strong commit-
ment to state sovereignty and Eleventh Amendment immunity. In a
1985 opinion, Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,6 the Court made
2. See Baldwin, supra note 1, at 639-40 ("The forms of [association with
for-profit business] are varied, including consulting by individual faculty
members; individual and institutional research grants; major contracts with the
university; affiliate programs; exchange of personnel; endowment or other
support of university research facilities; venture capital companies formed by
university researchers, sometimes with the participation of the university itself;
and finally joint ventures and other forms of consortia."). Also universities
sometimes spin off private research companies, to which they make substantial
investments. See Florida, supra note 1, at 4.
3. For a history of some of the congressional and administrative efforts,
see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents
and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV.
1663, 1663-95 (1996).
4. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28 (1980) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (1994)).
5. See Harvey Brooks & Lucien P. Randazzese, University-Industry Rela-
tions: The Next Four Years and Beyond, in INVESTING IN INNOVATION 361
(Lewis M. Branscomb & James H. Keller eds., 1998); Eisenberg, supra note 3,
at 1715.
6. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
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it plain that Congress can abrogate state Eleventh Amendment im-
munity only by using unmistakably clear statutory language. Since
the federal patent, copyright, and trademark statutes left room for
ambiguity, Atascadero raised serious doubts about the enforceability
of federal intellectual property laws against state defendants. 7 Con-
gress responded by clarifying its intent to abrogate only to have the
Court strike down the abrogation as beyond congressional power. 8 It
is now clear that private parties cannot sue state universities for dam-
ages for patent or copyright infringement unless the state consents to
suit. Moreover, it is also clear that Congress has very limited power
to change this result by legislation.
This Article explores the interaction between these two devel-
opments and focuses, in particular, on the impact of the Court's
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence on intellectual property relation-
ships between state universities and private industry. By furnishing
security against appropriation, federal and state intellectual property
laws reduce the risks associated with sharing valuable research and
proprietary information in a common venture. Moreover, by confer-
ring exclusivity over research results, intellectual property law makes
it possible for parties to extract the surplus from cooperation, thereby
making cooperation more attractive in the first place. Thus, one
might expect that an inability to enforce intellectual property laws
against state universities due to Eleventh Amendment immunity
would have a negative impact on university-industry research coop-
eration.
Whether this will be the result, however, depends on the incen-
tives of state universities to appropriate intellectual property and on
the legal and nonlegal alternatives available to private firms to pro-
tect themselves against appropriation. Critics of the Supreme
Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence predict widespread state
infringement, while defenders predict voluntary compliance by states
7. See Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 335 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding
that the State of California is immune from a patent infringement suit by rea-
son of the Eleventh Amendment).
8. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999); see also Alden v.
Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
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even without the threat of legal sanction. Both predictions are too
simplistic. They ignore the availability of informal mechanisms to
assure compliance, such as nonlegal sanctions and reputation effects,
and they overlook the ways in which infringement threats can alter
behavior without actually being carried out.
This Article argues that the Eleventh Amendment's impact is
likely to be more subtle and indirect. Because it undermines the
utility of property rights, the Eleventh Amendment tends to push pri-
vate firms toward reliance on contract to manage the risks of misap-
propriation. This shift from property to contract makes it more im-
portant for firms to limit disclosure to relational settings and thus
encourages greater reliance on secrecy for longer periods of time.
Problems arise because secrecy can impede cooperation and future
innovation. As a result, it is possible for a broad Eleventh Amend-
ment to produce significant social costs without leaving any substan-
tial record of actual state infringement. For this reason, the Supreme
Court's insistence on evidence of widespread infringement before
Congress can abrogate state immunity might prove a more formida-
ble obstacle to congressional abrogation and thus a more serious
threat to research and development than may at first appear.
The remainder of this Article is divided into four parts. Part II
outlines a rough taxonomy of situations in which state universities
interact with private industry regarding intellectual property assets.
All these situations create opportunities for intellectual property dis-
putes.
Part III analyzes the legal effect of the Supreme Court's Elev-
enth Amendment jurisprudence in the intellectual property field. It
concludes that state contract and trade secret remedies are the most
promising avenues for legal protection.
Part IV then examines the impact of Part III's legal analysis on
the different university-industry relationships described in Part II. It
disputes the simple account that assumes widespread state infringe-
ment. It predicts, instead, that there will be some amount of volun-
tary state compliance coupled with enhanced incentives for firms to
keep intellectual property assets secret and to use contract and trade
secret law to protect them.
The Article then concludes in Part V by exploring some of the
broader implications of these predictions. In the end, if the Eleventh
1470
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Amendment is a serious problem, its adverse impact may have less to
do with actual infringement and more to do with the indirect costs
created by strategic responses to heightened infringement risks.
II. A ROUGH TAXONOMY OF UNIVERSITY-RELATED
IP DIsPuTEs
The following is a brief taxonomy of intellectual property dis-
putes involving state universities. It distinguishes between situations
where appropriation occurs in the context of a pre-existing relation-
ship and situations where it does not. This distinction is important
because it affects a firm's options to manage the risks of state immu-
nity. In particular, only parties connected by a relationship can use
contract to circumvent immunity; strangers cannot.
A. No Relationship
The most straightforward way for an intellectual property dis-
pute to arise in the absence of a relationship is for state university
employees to use a patented invention, a copyrighted work of author-
ship, or some other intellectual property without the owner's con-
sent.9 For example, teachers at a state university might copy portions
of copyrighted books to make course packets, or stage a play or per-
form music without licensing the public performance rights from the
copyright owner.10 Similarly, university researchers might use a
process or a product to which someone else claims a patent," or a
9. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S 13556 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1999) (containing
remarks of Sen. Leahy introducing the Intellectual Property Protection Resto-
ration Act and noting the risks that state universities will appropriate intellec-
tual property freely).
10. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979) (al-
lowing a copyright owner to sue the state for using his song as the theme for
the Arizona State Fair). See generally UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
Copyright Liability of States and the Eleventh Amendment: A Report of the
Register of Copyrights 7-13 (1988) [hereinafter Register's Report] (summa-
rizing fears of copyright owners and publishers that state agencies will freely
copy works such as textbooks, music, and computer programs).
11. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999) (involving patent owner's claim that Florida state
board set up to administer a college tuition prepayment program infringed its
patent on a college financing method); Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (involving claim against the State of California for appropriating a
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state university might use someone else's trademark, logo, or clever
advertising jingle to market university services or products.' 2 In all
these cases, if the person claiming ownership of the intellectual
property--copyright, patent, or trademark-sues the state university
in federal court, the latter can interpose an Eleventh Amendment
immunity defense to the infringement suit.
Some of these cases may involve intentional infringement. For
example, an employee operating with a limited budget might choose
to copy a computer program rather than buy it, even when the em-
ployee knows copying is unlawful. Similarly, researchers under tight
deadlines or with limited funds might deliberately use a patented
process without consent. Some commentators even worry that state
universities will set up textbook copying mills that routinely dupli-
cate copyrighted books, or establish departments dedicated to identi-
fying and using valuable patents.
However, unintentional infringement presents a far more serious
risk.13 For example, a university might believe in good faith and on
legally colorable grounds that it has not infringed. It might claim, for
instance, that the patent or copyright is invalid, 14 that the allegedly
infringing work or invention is sufficiently different from the copy-
right or patent, or that the particular use is not legally prohibited. 
5
patented method for testing automobile exhaust emissions); Hercules v. Min-
nesota State Highway Dep't, 337 F. Supp. 795 (D. Minn. 1972) (involving
claim against a state highway department for using a patented process for weed
and pest control).
12. See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999) (involving claim against the Florida state board
administering a college tuition prepayment program for falsely advertising its
tuition savings plan).
13. See Patent Remedy Clarification Act: Hearings on H.R. 3886 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 101st Cong. 56-57, 70
(1990) [hereinafter House Patent Hearings].
14. A court can determine the validity of a patent or copyright in an in-
fringement suit. Patents can be declared invalid on numerous grounds, such as
that the invention is not patentable subject matter, see 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994),
or does not meet the nonobviousness requirement for patentability, see 35
U.S.C. § 103 (1994), or because patent protection is barred by 35 U.S.C. § 102
(1994). Copyrights can also be invalidated on such grounds as improper sub-
ject matter or lack of originality. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1996).
15. Copyright rights are subject to numerous categorical exclusions and
limitations and to a number of defenses. Patent rights are also limited.
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Under these circumstances, state immunity can scuttle any effort to
adjudicate the merits of the university's claim.
It is also possible for a university to infringe without knowing
that someone else claims exclusive rights. For example, university
researchers might use an invention, unaware that someone else al-
ready has a patent. Because patent rights bar independent invention
as well as copying, a person can infringe a patent even if the person
develops the invention independently and without any knowledge of
the pre-existing patent. So too, the university might purchase and
use a product that contains patented technology, unaware that the
vendor has manufactured and sold the product without authorization
from the patent owner.16 Indeed, some have argued that immunity
increases the likelihood that state employees will ignore signs of pos-
sible infringement and conduct sloppy investigations.
17
Finally, there are cases in which the university claims to own the
patent, copyright, or other intellectual property right. In these cir-
cumstances, someone else seeks to use the university's intellectual
property in the face of a demand from the university to cease such
use. Ordinarily, the user can bring a declaratory judgment action to
test the claimant's ownership and obtain a legal determination of
whether the use is, in fact, infringing. However, if the claimant is a
state university, the user faces a potential Eleventh Amendment bar-
rier to suit. Given that today's universities are heavily involved in
holding and licensing patent portfolios, many courts and commenta-
tors see the Eleventh Amendment obstacle to declaratory relief as
particularly troubling.18
16. See, e.g., Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. II. 1974)
(involving a patent owner suing the Illinois Bureau of Investigation (IBI) and
its supplier for patent infringement when IBI purchased offending device from
its codefendant supplier). See generally 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS § 16.02[2], at 16-32 (1998) (noting that infringement can occur when
the infringer innocently uses or resells a product made by a guilty manufac-
turer).
17. See House Patent Hearings, supra note 13, at 56-57, 70 (containing the
testimony of William S. Thompson, President, American Intellectual Property
Lawyers' Association and a letter from the Intellectual Property Owners, Inc.).
For example, a university might buy from a foreign manufacturer at an unusu-
ally low price under conditions that ordinarily signal possible patent infringe-
ment. The fear is that the university will ignore the signal.
18. These concerns have prompted some courts to use creative and ques-
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B. Pre-Existing Relationships
The second broad category involves intellectual property dis-
putes that arise in the context of a pre-existing relationship. In these
cases, the intellectual property owner might be able to contract for
use restrictions-an option not available when the appropriator is a
stranger. The simplest example of relational appropriation is the
transaction between buyer and seller. Suppose a university lawfully
purchases a copyrighted textbook or computer program and then
makes unauthorized copies for university courses or other university
use.19 If the seller is the copyright owner, then the purchase and sale
transaction creates a relationship between the parties that establishes
a basis for contractual protection.
More complex relationships present greater risks of appropria-
tion.20 For example, individual faculty members who regularly con-
sult for private industry are frequently exposed to proprietary infor-
mation and can use that information in unauthorized ways,
particularly if their use is difficult to detect. These risks are espe-
cially acute in the context of research collaborations and joint ven-
tures.
Some collaborations are relatively short-term and narrowly fo-
cused, designed mainly to develop a specific application, product, or
tionable theories to circumvent immunity in declaratory judgment actions.
See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446, 1453-
54 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that the university waived its immunity and con-
structively consented to the declaratory judgment suit), vacated and remanded,
119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999); New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
63 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (E.D. Calif. 1999) (noting the importance of declaratory
relief to the integrity of the patent system and holding that the university
waived its immunity by obtaining a patent).
19. See BV Eng'g v. UCLA, 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that
UCLA bought one copy each of seven computer programs and user manuals
and made unauthorized additional copies); Richard Anderson Photography v.
Radford Univ., 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988) (involving a state university offi-
cial making an unauthorized further use of copyrighted photographs purchased
from the plaintiff); Register's Report, supra note 10, at 11-12 (reporting fears
of one educational publisher that tight budgets will encourage state agencies to
purchase one or two copies of a work and reproduce the rest).
20. See Baldwin, supra note 1, at 639-40. The problems are not limited to
the science and technology field. See, e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157
F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 1998) (involving a suit against a state university's publish-
ing house for copyright infringement because the university continued to print
a book after termination of the publishing agreement).
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process. The firm provides funding as well as information-pro-
prietary and nonproprietary-and shares research personnel. In re-
turn, the firm usually negotiates for an assignment of, or exclusive
license to, the results of the research effort. The university benefits
by obtaining funding for its laboratories, support for graduate stu-
dents, and opportunities for faculty publication.
Other collaborations are longer term and more broadly con-
ceived, frequently taking the form of university-industry research
centers. 2 1 Participating private firms obtain exclusive rights to com-
mercially profitable intellectual property products, and also-and in
some cases more importantly 22 -exposure to cutting-edge ideas and
the opportunity to attract and train high quality graduate students.
From the university's perspective, the research center offers a private
source of funding that helps compensate for declining government
research support.
These different kinds of partnerships between universities and
the private sector are an important component of university research
these days and are strongly encouraged by federal legislative and
regulatory initiatives.23 Yet they are also fertile ground for intellec-
tual property disputes. For example, when a private firm shares its
21. See WESLEY COHEN ET AL., UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY RESEARCH
CENTERS IN THE UNITED STATES (1994) (reporting the results of a 1991 survey
showing that the number of university-industry research centers and the mag-
nitude of the research conducted are both "quite large," and that these centers
are "the principal vehicle for direct industry support of academic science and
engineering R&D").
22. See David C. Mowery, The Roles and Contributions of R & D Collabo-
ration: Matching Policy Goals and Design (visited Mar. 25, 2000)
<http://www.house.gov/science/mowery_03-1l.htm> [hereinafter House Sci-
ence Policy Hearings]. This material was prepared for the Hearings of the
National Science Policy Study, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, held on March 11, 1998. It contains the testimony of David C.
Mowery, U.C. Berkeley School of Business, noting that in some fields, such as
chemical engineering and semiconductors, access to new ideas and high qual-
ity graduate students is more important than intellectual property rights.). See
also David Blumenthal et al., Relationships Between Academic Institutions and
Industry in the Life Sciences-An Industry Survey, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 368,
370 (1996) (discussing how respondent firms involved in university research
joint ventures perceived more benefits from access to ideas, knowledge, and
talented potential researchers than from specific marketable inventions).
23. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
June 2000] 1475
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 33:1467
proprietary information with university researchers, there is a risk
that the university will use the information to its own advantage be-
24yond the scope of the collaboration. Moreover, these arrangements
typically provide that private firms assume rights to inventions and
other proprietary information products either by assignment or exclu-
sive license, and disputes can arise about the scope of these rights.
III. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
IN IP SUITS
In order to determine the impact of the Eleventh Amendment
and state sovereign immunity on the various scenarios discussed in
Part II, we must first understand in somewhat more detail how sover-
eign immunity limits intellectual property protection. The following
discussion examines enforcement of intellectual property rights first
in federal court and then in state court.
A. Enforcement in Federal Court-The Eleventh Amendment
1. Suit against the state university itself
Since its ratification in 1795, the Eleventh Amendment has been
construed broadly to preserve state sovereign immunity from suits in
federal court brought by private citizens, American Indian tribes,
citizens of foreign countries, and even foreign nations.25 The Elev-
enth Amendment applies to the state itself and to any of its agencies,
including state universities, 26 and it bars suits based on federal or
state claims.
27
24. See House Patent Hearings, supra note 13, at 24-25 (noting Professor
Robert Merges's testimony that a state university's immunity may deter private
firms from entering into research joint ventures).
25. For a clear overview of Eleventh Amendment law, see ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §§ 7.1-.7, at 387-446 (3d ed. 1999).
26. In fact, the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to state universi-
ties is not completely free from doubt, but most courts have found that state
universities are arms of the state for sovereign immunity purposes. See id. §
7.4, at 407. The Amendment clearly does not apply, however, to local munici-
palities or local officials, nor does it extend immunity to suits brought by the
United States or by sister states.
27. The Eleventh Amendment also extends to state officials sued for dam-
ages or other retroactive relief when the remedy will be paid out of the state
treasury. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); CHEMERINSKY, supra
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States can waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity by con-
senting to suit in federal court, just as they can waive sovereign im-
munity more generally. 28 But any such waiver has to meet the same
stringent requirements as waiver of other constitutional rights. It
must be voluntary and clearly and unequivocally expressed,2 9 and it
must specifically encompass suit in federal, not just state, court.30
Applying these general principles to the intellectual property
context, one might conclude that the Eleventh Amendment stands as
an insurmountable obstacle to patent, copyright, or trademark suits
brought by private parties against state universities in federal court.
But matters are not quite so simple, for Congress has the power to
abrogate state immunity under certain conditions. In 1990 and 1992,
Congress purported to exercise this power by enacting three bills-
collectively known as the "Remedy Clarification Acts" 31-that ex-
pressed a clear congressional intent to abrogate state Eleventh
Amendment immunity from private suits enforcing the federal intel-
32lectual property statutes. However, at the end of its 1998 Term, the
Supreme Court held two of these three statutes unconstitutional. In
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank,33 the Court struck down the Patent and Plant Variety
note 25, § 7.5.2, at 416-20. Also it extends to state officials sued for injunctive
relief when the claim is based on state rather than federal law. See Pennhurst
State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 25, § 7.5.3, at 423-29.
28. Thus, while immunity is often referred to as a jurisdictional obstacle, it
differs from other jurisdictional defenses in that it can be waived.
29. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 25, § 7.6, at 432.
30. See id.
31. See Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub.
L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§
2541(a)-(b), 2570 (1994) and 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296 (1994)); Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749 (1990) (codi-
fied as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 511, 901(a), 911(g) (1996)); Trade-
mark Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1122, 1125(a), 1127 (2000)).
32. The Remedy Clarification Acts were Congress's response to judicial
decisions in the late 1980s holding that the federal intellectual property laws
were not clear enough to effect an abrogation. See, e.g., Chew v. California,
893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990). These decisions applied the Supreme Court's
demanding standards for clarity established in Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
33. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
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Protection Remedy Clarification Act, and in College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board,34 the
Court struck down the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act insofar
as it applies to false advertising claims.
In these two decisions, the Court confirmed-some would say
extended-its earlier holding in Seminole Tribe v. Florida35 that Ar-
ticle I does not authorize abrogation by Congress. 36 The Court also
relied on its previous decision in City of Boerne v. Flores37 to con-
strue Congress's abrogation power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment quite narrowly. 38 In the case of patent rights, the Court
concluded that Congress had not identified a sufficiently widespread
and pervasive pattern of unconstitutional state infringement to sup-
port congressional abrogation under Section 5.39 In the case of false
advertising, the Court held that there was no deprivation of "prop-
erty" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment on which to
base an exercise of enforcement power.
40
34. 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
35. 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (holding that Congress cannot abrogate a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to an exercise of power under
Article I's Commerce Clause).
36. The Remedy Clarification Acts were adopted before the Court's deci-
sion in Seminole Tribe and at a time when it seemed likely that Congress could
act under Article I to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Pennsyl-
vania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality holding that the Com-
merce Clause conferred abrogation power). Congress relied on three sources
of constitutional power: the Copyright and Patent Clause of Article I, § 8, cl.
8; the Commerce Clause of Article I, § 8, cl. 3; and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Even after Seminole Tribe overruled Union Gas, there was still
some hope that Congress might have abrogation power under the Copyright
and Patent Clause-which was not at issue in Seminole Tribe-because of the
strong policy in favor of uniformity and federal regulation underlying that
clause. However, Florida Prepaid put this speculation to rest. See id. at 2200.
37. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
38. See also Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000) (inter-
preting Congress's Section 5 abrogation power narrowly to uphold an Eleventh
Amendment challenge to applying the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
to a state university).
39. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2207 ("[F]or Congress to invoke § 5,
it must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing
such conduct.").
40. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2224-26. In addition, College
Savings Bank all but eliminated the remaining vestiges of the constructive
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Little remains of the Remedy Clarification Acts after these deci-
sions.41 While the Court did not directly address the Copyright
waiver doctrine. See id. at 2230. According to this doctrine, the state implic-
itly waives its immunity whenever it voluntarily participates in federally regu-
lated activity after Congress clearly conditions such participation on waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. The plaintiff in College Savings
Bank argued that the State of Florida constructively waived its immunity by
selling and advertising a for-profit college savings program in interstate com-
merce. See id. at 2226. The Supreme Court rejected the argument and in so
doing cut back sharply on Congress's power to force waiver by attaching con-
ditions to federal programs. See id. at 2229. If anything remains of construc-
tive waiver after College Savings Bank, it is limited to cases where the federal
government purchases waiver with a "gift" or "gratuity." Id. at 2231 (illus-
trating with the example of waiver attached to receipt of federal highway
funds). When the inducement is a federal gift, a state that chooses to retain its
immunity merely foregoes an additional benefit, the majority argued, and thus
its waiver is voluntary and not "coerced." Id. The state's refusal to waive in
College Savings Bank would have resulted in exclusion from otherwise lawful
marketing activity, a sanction that made the federal bargain cross the line into
coercion. Id. See also Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 57 F.
Supp. 2d 710 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (refusing to find a constructive waiver on the
gift/gratuity theory); New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63
F. Supp. 2d 1240 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (finding a constructive waiver on the
gift/gratuity theory).
41. Congress is now considering a bill, the Intellectual Property Protection
Restoration Act of 1999, which tries to get around state immunity by using a
waiver theory rather than abrogation. See S. 1835, 106th Cong. (1999). This
bill conditions a state's receipt of federal intellectual property rights on the
state's providing explicit assurance that it will waive its sovereign immunity.
However, the waiver is not enforceable in a subsequent action; instead, a state
that breaches its assurance forfeits the opportunity to rely on federal law to
protect its own intellectual property for a fixed period. The bill's sponsor ar-
gues that the waiver satisfies College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999),
because the state has no "inherent entitlement" to federal intellectual property
rights and can freely choose whether to pay the waiver price in return for the
federal benefits. In this view, the grant of federal rights is, in effect, a gift or
gratuity, like the grants that Congress makes pursuant to its Spending Clause
power. See 145 CONG. REC. S13557 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1999) (statement of
Sen. Leahy).
Whether this waiver approach will work is doubtful. Its constitutional-
ity depends on the Court's classifying federal intellectual property rights as a
"gift" and the denial of those rights as nonreceipt of a benefit rather than impo-
sition of a sanction. The classification depends here, as it does in the closely
related area of unconstitutional conditions, on how the Court defines the base-
line. Given the long history and considerable importance of federal intellectual
property rights, it seems likely that the Court will include federal patents and
copyrights in the set of baseline entitlements and thus classify their denial as
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Remedy Clarification Act or the Trademark Remedy Clarification
Act as it applies to trademark infringement, the principles of Florida
Prepaid and College Savings Bank would seem to condemn these
remaining statutory provisions as well.42 Thus, a person who wishes
unconstitutional coercion. However, the outcome is far from certain.
42. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 605-608 (5th Cir.
2000) (holding the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act unconstitutional);
Rodriguez v. Texas Comm'n on the Arts, 199 F.3d 279, 281 (5th Cir. 2000)
(same). In Florida Prepaid, the Court held that Congress's failure to mention
the Just Compensation Clause when it explicitly relied on other constitutional
provisions precluded consideration of that clause as a basis for the Patent
Remedy Clarification Act. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2208 n.7. The
same is true of the Trademark and Copyright Remedy Clarification Acts. See
also Christina Bohannan & Thomas F. Cotter, When the State Steals Ideas: Is
the Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity from Federal Infringement Claims
Constitutional in Light of Seminole Tribe?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1458-
77 (1999) (arguing that the Just Compensation Clause cannot support any of
the Remedy Clarification Acts).
Moreover, Congress did no better job documenting state Fourteenth
Amendment violations for copyrights and trademarks than it did for patents.
Although the House commissioned the Register of Copyrights to conduct a
study, the resulting Report hardly documents an extensive pattern of state
copyright infringement; indeed, most of those who offered input expressed fear
of future infringement and cited few examples of present or past infringement.
See Register's Report, supra note 10. This is also true of testimony received
by the House and Senate Committees. This omission is likely to be as fatal to
the case under Section 5 for the Trademark and Copyright Remedy Clarifica-
tion Acts as it was in Florida Prepaid for the Patent Remedy Clarification Act.
But see Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2215 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that Congress's documentation of state copyright infringement might be suffi-
cient to support Section 5 abrogation under the Florida Prepaid test).
In addition, all of the Remedy Clarification Acts take the same sweep-
ing approach to abrogation, subjecting all states to suit in federal court in all
cases. Congress's failure to make any attempt to tailor the statute's scope and
remedies to instances of arguably constitutional violation doomed the Patent
Remedy Clarification Act, see id. at 2210, and is likely to do so for the other
acts as well.
Finally, although the precise scope left for the constructive waiver doc-
trine under the gift/gratuity theory is unclear, it seems unlikely that it would
save the Remedy Clarification Acts, especially as the theory was not even
mentioned in Florida Prepaid. See generally Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446, 1453-54 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that waiver is
not based solely on the university's decision to obtain a patent), vacated and
remanded, 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999). But see New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (applying the waiver
theory to subject a state university to a declaratory judgment suit for patent in-
validity when the university obtained the patent). Indeed, there is sufficient
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to enforce federal intellectual property rights against a state univer-
sity cannot sue the university itself in federal court. And in the case
of federal patent and copyright claims, a person cannot sue in state
court either, because federal courts have exclusive subject matter ju-
risdiction over those claims.
43
2. Suit against state university officers and employees
Even so, an aggrieved party is not entirely without access to
federal remedies under current law. In several different contexts, the
Supreme Court has allowed suits against state officials on the theory
that such suits are not really against the state itself and thus not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.4 Three different variations on
this strategy are worth considering: (1) a suit directly under the fed-
eral patent, copyright, or trademark statute, relying on Ex parte
Young45 to circumvent immunity; (2) a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 198346
based on violations of federal patent, copyright, or trademark law;
and (3) a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the federal
Constitution. The following discussion is not intended to be a thor-
ough parsing of all the complex issues involved. My aim is more
modest: to demonstrate that each of these options is risky and that
none provides a remedy equivalent to that which could be obtained
against a state university in the absence of immunity.
47
doubt about the continuing vitality of the Remedy Clarification Acts that Con-
gress is now considering a bill that takes a different approach to abrogation for
all federal intellectual property statutes. See Intellectual Property Restoration
Act of 1999, S. 1835 106th Cong. (1999).
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000). Subject matter jurisdiction over
trademark infiingement claims under the Lanham Act is concurrent, but states
can still assert their traditional sovereign immunity against such claims in their
own courts. See Alden v. Maine, 577 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that states can
assert a sovereign immunity defense even to federal claims brought in state
court).
44. For a succinct discussion of these exceptions, see CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 25, at § 7.5.
45. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
46 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
47. Previous commentators have surveyed portions of this legal terrain.
See, e.g., Bohannan & Cotter, supra note 42, at 1511-14; Scott P. Glauberman,
Citizen Suits Against States: The Exclusive Jurisdiction Dilemma, 45 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y USA 63, 78-116 (1997).
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a. suit directly under federal IP statutes
A party who employs the first option would bring suit directly
against the state officers or employees responsible for the infringe-
ment, alleging a claim based on the federal intellectual property stat-
utes. Each of these statutes authorizes private suits for injunctive re-
lief and damages, as well as other remedies. Moreover, the doctrine
of Ex parte Young,48 an exception to the Eleventh Amendment, al-
lows suits of this sort against state officials, but only for injunctive
and other prospective relief and not for damages. To recover dam-
ages, the intellectual property owner must sue state university offi-
cers/employees in their individual rather than official capacities.
49
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit for damages against a
state official in the official's individual capacity so long as liability
attaches to the official personally and the damages are not paid di-
rectly from the state treasury.
50
There are several problems with this strategy, however. For one
thing, suit is only available under the federal intellectual property
statutes to the extent the statute in question makes offi-
cers/employees liable for acts of infringement committed in the
course of their employment. Although the exact scope of offi-
cer/employee liability for infringement is not entirely clear,51 it ap-
pears that a corporate employee who commits an act of infringement
may be held individually liable, along with the corporation, if the in-
fringement results from an exercise of judgment or discretion in the
choice of material. 2 By the same token, an employee will not be
held liable simply for executing clearly defined, nondiscretionary
duties.53 Similar principles apply to managing officers who do not
48. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
49. See Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114, 122-23
(4th Cir. 1988) (holding that a state university official can be sued individually
for damages for copyright infringement even though the university is immune
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment).
50. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 25, § 7.5.2, at 421-23.
51. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A][3][d] (1999); 5 CHISUM, supra note 16, § 16.06[2].
52. See NIMMER, supra note 51, at 12-93; 5 CHISUM, supra note 16, at 16-
258 to 16-259.
53. See NIMMER, supra note 51, at 12-93; 5 CHISUM, supra note 16, at 16-
258 to 16-259.
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participate directly in the infringement: they can be held personally
liable only if they act willfully and knowingly to induce or further
the infringement.
54
Under these principles, it is quite possible that an offi-
cer/employee would not be personally liable if a state university es-
tablished a systematic program of deliberate infringement, such as a
textbook copying mill or a new department aimed specifically at ap-
propriating valuable patents, and the officer/employee simply carried
out the fixed requirements of the program. On the other hand, a uni-
versity professor might be personally liable for including copyrighted
material in a course packet so long as the choice to do so was the
professor's own.55 Personal liability may also attach to a university
researcher who uses a patented process, but only if the researcher's
choice to use the particular process was discretionary and informed
by knowledge of the patent.
Thus, the statutory claim itself does not reach all instances of in-
fringement. Indeed, the more systematic and deliberate the univer-
sity's practices at the highest university level, the less likely it seems
that officers and employees would be held individually liable for
simply carrying out those practices.56
This is not the only problem with the statutory claim. To see the
other difficulties, we must discuss the claim for damages and the
claim for injunctive relief separately.
First, consider the damages claim. By the same principles that
apply to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a state officer/employee might enjoy
qualified immunity from suit for damages based directly on the
54. See NIMMER, supra note 51, at 12-93; 5 CHISUM, supra note 16, at 16-
258 to 16-259.
55. The university might also be vicariously liable under these circum-
stances. See NIMMER, supra note 51, § 12.04[A][1]. Universities today try to
avoid vicarious liability by establishing clear policies and procedures to guard
against this sort of infringement. Professors who infringe in flagrant violation
of these policies, however, can be more easily seen as acting on their own ini-
tiative and thus more likely to be held personally liable.
56. This assumes, of course, that the federal statutes will be interpreted the
same way in private and public cases. It is possible that a court might interpret
the existing statutes to adopt more expansive rules of employee liability for
state institutions. Furthermore, Congress presumably could amend the federal
statutes to provide for strict officer/employee liability in these cases, without
regard to culpability.
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federal intellectual property statutes.5 7 This result seems reasonable,
for plaintiffs otherwise could easily frustrate the public policies sup-
porting qualified immunity by suing directly under the federal statute
instead of under section 1983.58
Qualified immunity in the section 1983 context requires that the
state officer's conduct violate "clearly established statutory or con-
stitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
59
If this standard also applies to claims directly under the federal stat-
utes, then a damage action would not be effective in all cases. Al-
though a university official could be held liable for willful and
knowing infringement, as when the official deliberately copies a
copyrighted work or uses a patented invention knowing it is under
patent, there would probably be no liability in the large class of po-
tential state university infringements that lack the requisite knowl-
edge or intent. These include situations in which university employ-
ees independently invent already patented technology, use a patented
process that they learn from others without knowledge of the patent,
or buy infringing products from third parties unaware that the prod-
uct infringes.
To be sure, the federal statute itself will not reach offi-
cers/employees in some of these cases entirely apart from qualified
immunity. However, the qualified immunity doctrine probably ex-
cludes more. For example, qualified immunity-but not the statute
itself-might bar damages liability if the defendant has a colorable
but erroneous defense to infringement, as when copying might
appear to be justified as fair use60 or when use of a technology
57. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 25, § 8.6.3.
58. Although the Supreme Court has used statutory interpretation to read
the immunity defense into section 1983, it has also relied heavily on public
policy. Moreover, the Court has recognized qualified immunity in other con-
texts, such as Bivens suits against federal officers, not covered by section 1983.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
59. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
60. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). The fair use doctrine incorporates a bal-
ancing test that is sufficiently vague to provide at least colorable justifications
for many instances of copying.
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might appear to be justified on grounds of patent invalidity or
non-infringement.
61
The other problem with a damage action stems from the fact that
the individual, and not the state, is responsible for the damage award.
As a result, a party who has suffered loss substantial enough to jus-
tify bringing a lawsuit must consider the very real possibility that the
defendant has insufficient personal assets to cover the loss. This risk
is mitigated to some extent if the state has agreed to indemnify its of-
ficials, 62 but that depends on whether the state has chosen to do so
for the particular acts in question as well as on the scope of the in-
demnification the state has decided to give.
63
Now consider the claim for injunctive relief. The availability of
an injunction will do little to make suit against state offi-
cers/employees any more attractive than the damages claim alone.
64
An injunction, while it corrects the problem for the future,65 does
nothing to compensate for past losses and has only a limited deter-
rent effect on incentives to infringe. With litigation delays and un-
certainty over obtaining preliminary injunctive relief,66 a state
61. Just as Congress can amend the federal intellectual property statutes to
expand liability, so too Congress should be able to limit the availability of the
qualified immunity defense in these cases. Qualified immunity has its roots in
the common law and does not have a constitutional pedigree. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 25, § 8.6.1. Thus, the defense should be amenable
to congressional tinkering. I am indebted to symposium participants for alert-
ing me to this possibility.
62. The Eleventh Amendment is not triggered by a state's decision to in-
demnify its officers for personal liability despite the fact that the liability is ul-
timately paid from the state treasury.
63. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 25, § 8.6.1, at 496-97 (noting that
indemnification policies "vary enormously among jurisdictions"). Indeed, it
could turn out that liability is most likely under current law just where indem-
nification is least likely, because indemnification agreements often exclude
willful and intentional wrongdoing from coverage.
64. See, e.g., Register's Report, supra note 10, at 6, 13-15 (noting that 11 of
44 public comments received on the immunity issue stressed the inadequacy of
injunctive relief, and summarizing the main deficiencies).
65. Some have argued that the state could easily circumvent an injunction
against an officer or employee by assigning the infringing tasks to someone
else. See id. at 15. However, contempt sanctions also extend to third parties
who participate or assist in trying to circumvent an injunction's binding effect.
See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 65(d).
66. When the infringer is a state, it will often be possible to argue that con-
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university might reasonably expect to profit significantly from in-
fringement before being enjoined.
Indeed, given the risks and expense of litigation, a rational
plaintiff might even conclude that filing suit solely to obtain an in-
junction is not worth the costs. Plaintiffs cannot use contingency fee
arrangements when they seek only injunctive relief, and fee-
shifting67 under the federal copyright, patent, and trademark statutes
is usually limited to instances of deliberate, willful, or otherwise cul-
pable conduct. 6 8 A prospective plaintiff therefore must consider the
possibility that the suit will have to be financed out-of-pocket, a risk
that could be especially onerous for small firms with few resources
to devote to litigation. 69 Moreover, for firms marketing intellectual
property with a short shelf life, such as some computer software, the
market value remaining by the time the preliminary injunction stage
is reached could be so small that the firm would not rationally file
suit in the first place if it were limited to injunctive relief.
Hence, the injunction remedy is inadequate standing alone. This
means that the availability of a claim for damages is crucial to the ef-
ficacy of the statutory remedy. But the damages claim suffers from
the shortcomings discussed above.
A final point is worth mentioning. In cases where a university
employee cannot be held liable under the usual statutory rules of em-
ployee liability, there is a possibility that a court would recognize an
implied statutory claim to fill the enforcement gap left by the
tinuing the use serves the public interest. Under these circumstances, a court
might deny the preliminary injunction on the ground that the harm from
granting it outweighs the harm from denying it. If the preliminary injunction is
denied, the state has a much longer time to benefit from infringement. Indeed,
a rational person deciding whether to sue will discount the benefit from a pre-
liminary injunction by the probability it will be granted, and this calculation
might deter filing in the first place.
67. Fee awards, when otherwise available, are generally considered ancil-
lary relief and permitted in a suit based on Ex parte Young notwithstanding
their monetary character. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690-93 (1978).
68. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1998) (patent); 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1998) (copy-
right); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1998) (trademark). See generally 7 CHISUM, su-
pra note 16, § 20.03[4][c] (noting that courts interpret § 505 to require some
element of moral blame); 4 NIMMER, supra note 51, § 14.10[D][1] (same).
69. See Register's Report, supra note 10, at 6 (noting that 6 of 44 public
comments on the immunity issue worried about whether small companies
would have the resources to battle states).
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Eleventh Amendment.70  For example, if a state university estab-
lished a textbook copying mill, the Copyright Act itself might not
impose personal liability on university officials or employees for
their acts in simply carrying out the requirements of the infringing
university program. If it also turns out that the statutory remedy
against the university employer is worthless because of the Eleventh
Amendment, a court might fill the statutory gap by at least authoriz-
ing injunctive relief against individual employees. 7'
There are substantial obstacles to this strategy, however. For
one thing, it has to confront the Court's extremely restrictive ap-
proach to finding implied statutory claims. Furthermore, Ex parte
Young cannot be used to supplement enforcement of a federal statute
that already has its own detailed enforcement scheme-even when
the Eleventh Amendment bars use of that statutory scheme.72 Thus,
70. See Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment, and
the Potential Evisceration of Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 514-17
(1997) (noting the distinction between an implied statutory claim and avoid-
ance of immunity).
71. In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court assumed that an Exparte Young
suit for injunctive relief would be available to enforce the intellectual property
laws against state actors. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 n.16. However,
the Court did not make clear whether Ex parte Young would still be available
even in those cases where there was no remedy against the state actor directly
under the statute.
72. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74 (holding that the Exparte Young ex-
ception was not available because Congress intended recourse to the detailed
enforcement scheme in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act rather than suit in
federal court); Wisconsin Bell, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 718 (holding that the Exparte
Young remedy is not available because Congress provided an alternative rem-
edy, judicial review of state commission action). Indeed, some commentators
read Seminole Tribe and other recent Supreme Court cases as signaling the
possibility that the Court will cut back significantly on the Ex parte Young
doctrine itself. For more on the Seminole Tribe exception to Ex parte Young,
see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 25, § 7.5.3, at 428-29. For a critical analysis of
the exception, see generally Jackson, supra note 70.
The factors that caused the Court to carve out another exception to Ex
parte Young in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 287-88 (1997), do
not seem to apply to the intellectual property field. Because federal jurisdic-
tion is exclusive over patent and copyright infringement claims, there is no
state forum that can vindicate the federal interests. Moreover, intellectual
property suits always raise questions of federal law, and at least in the case of
patent and copyright, Congress has made clear that it strongly favors the sort of
uniformity achieved through federal adjudication. Most importantly, patent,
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Exparte Young would not be available to fill enforcement gaps in the
federal intellectual property statutes if courts were to find the statuto-
rily prescribed enforcement schemes sufficiently detailed and com-
prehensive. 73 Finally, even if an implied claim were recognized, in-
tellectual property owners would still face the same practical
obstacles to suit discussed above.
b. a section 1983 suit based on IP statutes
The second option relies on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for authority to
seek injunctive relief and damages based on violations of the intel-
lectual property statutes. This option adds something to the first only
if section 1983 can be used to provide a cause of action against state
officers/employees when the federal statute itself does not.
However, there are serious problems with this strategy. First, it
is not at all clear that section 1983 can be used in this way. If a court
were to find that the federal patent, copyright, and trademark statutes
create "comprehensive enforcement mechanisms" of their own, a
section 1983 action could be precluded on the theory that Congress
intended the statutes to provide the exclusive mode of recovery.
74
Second, even if section 1983 were available as a legal matter, the
plaintiff would still have to contend with the practical problems to
successful litigation discussed under the first option.
c. a section 1983 suit based on the Constitution
If section 1983 cannot be used to enforce the federal statutes, an
intellectual property owner could still try to obtain relief against state
officers/employees for constitutional violations. If state infringement
constitutes a taking of property without just compensation or a depri-
vation of property without due process, Ex parte Young and section
1983 can be used to enforce the Takings and Due Process Clauses.
copyright, and trademark suits do not present issues as central to state sover-
eignty as those involved in Coeur d'Alene. See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 97 C 2225, 97 C 4096 1998 WL 156678, at *11-13
(N.D. Ill. 1998) (discussing the implications of Cour d'Alene).
73. The federal intellectual property laws do have a variety of special en-
forcement rules, including rules limiting damages for innocent infringement,
rules allowing statutory damages, and special rules regarding attorney's fees.
74. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1981); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 25, § 8.8.
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However, there are a number of difficulties with suits of this sort, as
well as limitations on available remedies. 75 Moreover, many of the
practical difficulties with financing suits for injunctive relief and
obtaining damages from impecunious university employees, which
are discussed above in connection with statutory enforcement, also
apply to constitutional claims.
3. Waiver by contract
To recap the discussion so far, a victim of state university in-
fringement faces major obstacles to using federal law to obtain relief.
Because of the Eleventh Amendment, the university itself cannot be
sued. There are strategies for obtaining relief directly from univer-
sity officers and employees responsible for the infringement, but
each such strategy is plagued with substantial legal and practical
risks.
76
75. See generally Bohannan & Cotter, supra note 42 (discussing some of
these issues). Even so, a prevailing plaintiff might have a better chance of ob-
taining attorney's fees in a § 1983 suit based on the Constitution than in a suit
based directly on the federal intellectual property statutes because § 1983 fee
awards are not limited to deliberate or culpable conduct. See 42 U.S.C. §
1988.
76. The discussion in the text focuses on situations in which an intellectual
property owner sues a state university for infringement. The Eleventh
Amendment also limits remedies in other situations. For example, if the uni-
versity claims the intellectual property right and sues first for infringement, the
Eleventh Amendment might bar a counterclaim for invalidity or other affirma-
tive relief. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 777 F. Supp.
779, 786 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (barring interference counterclaims as affirmative
relief); Woelffer v. Happy States of Am., Inc., 626 F. Supp. 499, 502-03 (N.D.
Ill. 1985) (setting out the general rule that filing suit waives the Eleventh
Amendment only for counterclaims or defenses that arise from the same events
as the infringement action and that diminish or defeat the state's recovery). As
a second example, suppose that a private party wishes to use a patented inven-
tion owned by a state university and the university threatens to sue but does not
file. The Eleventh Amendment is likely to preclude a suit by the private party
for declaratory relief-although a few courts have refused to enforce the Elev-
enth Amendment in these circumstances by relying on some type of waiver
theory. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d
1446, 1453-54 (Fed. Cir. 1998), vacated and remanded, 119 S. Ct. 2388
(1999); New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d
1240 (E.D. Cal. 1999). But see Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., No. 97-1099, 96-1361, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20198, at *1 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 26, 1999) (ordering additional briefing on the waiver theory in light of
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An intellectual property owner can avoid all these problems,
however, if the state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity to
suit for infringement. Under these circumstances, a state university
could be sued directly for violation of the federal intellectual prop-
erty statutes to the same extent as a private university.
The difficulty is that states have not generally waived Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the intellectual property field. Neverthe-
less, the absence of a general waiver should not prevent an intellec-
tual property owner from securing contractual waivers in connection
with particular transactions. If the owner were able to obtain the ex-
press and unambiguous consent of a properly authorized university
official waiving the university's Eleventh Amendment immunity,
then the owner might be able to enforce the waiver against a defense
of immunity raised in a subsequent copyright, patent, or trademark
suit.
This strategy is feasible, however, only if the infringement takes
place in a relational context, for only then can a contractual waiver
be obtained in advance. For example, if a firm sells or licenses its
intellectual property to the state university, the firm could include in
the sales or licensing agreement an explicit clause making clear that
the university waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity for disputes
arising from the sale or license. Firms could also insist on similar
provisions in contracts creating university-industry cooperative ven-
tures.
To employ this strategy, the intellectual property owner must be
able to show that the university has the authority under state law to
waive the state's immunity and that the particular university official
executing the contract has the power to do so.7 7 In Innes v. Kansas
State University,78 the court held that a state university had validly
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to an action by a debtor
to discharge student loans. The university had explicitly agreed to
the waiver in its contract to participate in the federal student loan
the Supreme Court's remand after College Savings Bank).
77. To be valid, the contract must clearly and unambiguously specify
waiver. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (requir-
ing clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity in state statute or as condition
of participation in federal program).
78. 184 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 1999).
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program.79  The court found that a Kansas statute specifically
authorizing state universities to enter into such contracts conferred
the requisite authority on the university.
80
Consistent with Innes, it might be enough if a state statute spe-
cifically authorizes the state university to enter into contracts with
private firms dealing with intellectual property and also empowers
the university to discharge all the obligations of its contracts. 81 This
approach makes the effectiveness of waiver depend on the particular
state's statutes, but many states have relatively broad statutes that
give considerable power to state universities to enter into intellectual
property transactions. 82 If the university has the power to waive im-
munity under such a statute, then some university official will cer-
tainly have the authority to act for the university in that regard.
83
79. See id. at 1282-84.
80. See id. at 1281-82.
81. Even so, Innes involved an explicit waiver in connection with a federal
program, whereas my situation involves waiver in connection with a private
contractual arrangement. There might still be some doubt whether a state can
waive its immunity by contract with a private party. All the reported instances
of state waiver of which I am aware involve express waiver in a state statute or
constitutional provision or waiver exacted by the federal government in con-
nection with a federal program. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 n.1 ("A State
may effectuate a waiver of its constitutional immunity by a state statute or con-
stitutional provision, or by otherwise waiving its immunity to suit in the con-
text of a particular federal program."). None involves a contractual waiver
given to a private party for that party's private benefit. However, I can see no
reason to preclude waiver in these situations when the waiver reflects an in-
formed and voluntary policy choice by authorized state officials. Indeed, a re-
fusal to enforce contractual waivers under these circumstances could well be
detrimental to state interests in the long run by undermining the state's ability
to credibly bind itself to beneficial contracts ex ante. Thus, one might easily
enlist the policy of respect for state sovereignty that underlies the Eleventh
Amendment itself to support enforcement of all contractual waivers.
82. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 75, § 14A (West 1996) (granting
broad power to the Trustees of the University of Massachusetts to enter into
transactions regarding intellectual property); see also Candela Corp. v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 976 F. Supp. 90 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that a California
constitutional provision granting virtual plenary power over university affairs
to the Regents, including the power to sue and be sued, has the effect of dele-
gating to the Regents the power to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity).
83. See Innes, 184 F.3d at 1284 n.5 (noting that none of the parties argued
that the official executing the contract did not have authority to do so). None-
theless, it would be advisable to use a high ranking university official, espe-
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B. Enforcement in State Court-State Sovereign Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment applies only to suits brought in fed-
eral court. However, a patent or copyright owner cannot avoid Elev-
enth Amendment problems by the simple expedient of suing in state
court, because only the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction
over federal patent and copyright claims.84  Moreover, Congress
cannot circumvent the immunity obstacle merely by making federal
subject matter jurisdiction concurrent with state court. Such a move
would simply convert the immunity issue from one involving the
Eleventh Amendment to one involving the state's sovereign immu-
nity law."
Thus, intellectual property owners receive no benefit from
choosing a state forum if they wish to enforce federal intellectual
property rights. This still leaves the possibility of using state law in-
stead, but there are substantial problems with state remedies as
well.86
The relevant state claims are usually narrower in scope than
their federal counterparts. For example, while state trade secret law
protects inventions within the general scope of patentable subject
matter, it requires that tfe owner take special efforts to keep the in-
formation secret. Moreover, trade secret law protects secrets only
cially given the current Supreme Court's protective attitude toward state sover-
eignty.
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994).
85. Furthermore, Congress faces the same difficulties abrogating state sov-
ereign immunity in state court as it does abrogating Eleventh Amendment im-
munity in federal court. In Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999), the
Supreme Court held that Congress lacks power under Article I to abrogate a
state's sovereign immunity to suits for damages in state court, just as it does
for federal court. The Court reasoned that the Eleventh Amendment enforces a
more fundamental constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity, a prin-
ciple that was essential to the original constitutional design and that limits
Congress's power to abrogate state immunity in both state and federal court.
See id. at 2247-66. At the same time, the Court noted that Congress can abro-
gate immunity in state court through a proper exercise of its enforcement pow-
ers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 2267.
86. In the text, I focus on the limitations of state substantive law. However,
there are other potential disadvantages to a state forum. For example, state
procedure can be less favorable to plaintiffs, and state court judges may lack
the expertise of the federal judiciary, especially the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals.
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against wrongful appropriation, which usually requires breach of a
duty of confidentiality owed to the trade secret owner. This restric-
tion means that it is perfectly lawful to use a trade secret if it is re-
verse-engineered or independently invented-even when this same
use would constitute infringement under patent law.
87
The state remedies that substitute for federal copyright are even
more limited. The traditional common law copyright tort is no
longer available for copyrightable works. 88 Other possible claims,
such as reverse passing off or trade dress protection, have yet to be
tested under the law of most states, and in their federal guise, offer
much more limited protection than federal copyright.89
The picture is a bit rosier for trademark law but here too state
substitutes fall short.90 In particular, state trademark law does not
confer the nationwide rights that trademark owners enjoy by regis-
tering their marks on the Principal Register of the federal Lanham
Act.91 Nor does state trademark law offer the federal benefit of in-
contestability, 92 or in many states, the advantages of an antidilution
claim.
93
87. See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in
Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REv. 241, 247-51 (1998) (summarizing cur-
rent trade secret doctrine).
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999) (preempting common law
copyright in original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of ex-
pression).
89. Most reverse passing off and trade dress claims are decided under sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). The tort of reverse
passing off provides relief when the defendant passes off plaintiffs product as
its own. The tort has been applied occasionally to cases in which defendant
takes plaintiffs otherwise copyrightable work without crediting plaintiffs
authorship. See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981). Sometimes
courts stretch trade dress theory to provide protection resembling copyright,
but these cases are not routine and are quite controversial. Although there is
no obvious impediment to bringing trade dress and reverse passing off cases
under state law, the fact that most of these cases have been decided under sec-
tion 43(a) means there is little state law precedent to follow.
90. Since Lanham Act claims can be brought in state court, recourse to state
trademark law would be necessary only if state sovereign immunity barred
suits under federal law but not under state law.
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 1072.
92. See id. §§ 1065, 1115(b).
93. Partly because only about one-half of the states have antidilution stat-
utes, Congress in 1996 adopted a federal antidilution remedy. See Federal
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Nevertheless, there are three ways that an intellectual property
owner might try to obtain broader relief against state universities un-
der state law. The first possibility is to bring a claim for misappro-
priation.94 Where it applies, the tort of misappropriation gives relief
for improper appropriation of commercially valuable information.
95
Although some courts require a relationship of direct competition
between the plaintiff and the defendant, 96 most courts shun formal
rules and use the tort to grant relief on policy grounds when relief is
not otherwise available under more conventional legal theories. 97 As
such, the misappropriation tort would seem ideally suited to fill the
gaps in patent and copyright protection caused by state sovereign
immunity.
But there is a problem with using misappropriation. The closer
the tort approaches patent or copyright, the more likely it will be pre-
empted by the Patent or Copyright Acts. 98 Preemption is hardly a
certainty, even if the rights created by the misappropriation tort du-
plicate federal law. Since preemption in the intellectual property
field turns on congressional intent, one might argue that Congress
did not intend to preempt state law when that law is used to fill gaps
that Congress meant to fill but could not because of Eleventh
Amendment obstacles. This is a far cry from the typical preemption
scenario in which state law either substitutes for federal law or pro-
tects subject matter that Congress meant to leave in the public do-
main.99 Even so, the preemption risk remains substantial. 100
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (1996)).
94. The famous case of International News Service v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215 (1918), is usually credited with giving birth to the tort of misappro-
priation, and some, but not all, states have followed its lead.
95. See id. at 245. The misappropriation tort is quite controversial, and not
clearly available in all states, especially in a broad form.
96. See, e.g., United States Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., 749 F.2d 1028
(3d Cir. 1984).
97. See Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d 84, 90 (Ill. 1983)
(rejecting a requirement of competitive injury).
98. See 17 U.S.C. § 301; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 156-68 (1989).
99. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141
(1989). See also Jacob's Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 626 So.
2d 1333, 1336-37 (Fla. 1993) (using a similar argument to find no preemption).
100. In fact, one might have a more difficult time arguing against preemption
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A second possibility is to bring an inverse condemnation action.
Using this approach, the intellectual property owner would argue that
the state has, in effect, taken the owner's intellectual property for a
public purpose without providing just compensation. However, a
number of doctrinal complexities limit the availability of relief on
this theory. For one thing, the state's waiver of sovereign immunity
to condemnation proceedings must be construed to extend to in-
fringement of intellectual property rights.' 0' In addition, the in-
fringement must be serious enough to qualify as a "taking" of prop-
erty rather than just a permissible exercise of state regulatory
power. 10 2 Furthermore, the taking must be an authorized action of
the state so that it qualifies as a government taking rather than simply
an act of infringement conducted by an individual state officer or
employee.
10 3
The third possibility is likely to be the most promising of the
three, since it gives broader control to the intellectual property
owner. The owner can spell out as express contract terms the rights
he would have had under federal law but for the Eleventh Amend-
ment, and then use state contract law to enforce those rights against
for copyright than for patent. The statutory conditions for preemption set out
in section 301 of the Copyright Act would all seem to be satisfied by a misap-
propriation tort that provides protection equivalent to federal copyright law.
By contrast, patent preemption is a matter of judge-made law and might be
more flexible as a result.
101. See, e.g., Jacobs Wind, 626 So. 2d at 1335-37 (holding that a patent
holder may assert a takings claim in state court for state infringement of his
federal patent rights).
102. See generally Bohannan & Cotter, supra note 42, at 1461-63 (discuss-
ing the difficulty of applying "takings" precedent to intellectual property).
103. Cf. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. State, 902 S.W.2d 576, 578-79 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that the benefits received by the state from hiring con-
tractors who infringed a patent did not render the infringement a "taking" be-
cause there was no direct participation in, or intentional act of, infringement by
the state); Bohannan & Cotter, supra note 42, at 1475-77 (discussing the
authorization issue in the context of Fifth Amendment takings claims). In ad-
dition, it is necessary that the inverse condemnation claim based on a taking of
property in the form of a patent or copyright not be preempted by the federal
intellectual property statutes. See, e.g., Jacobs Wind, 626 So. 2d at 1335-37
(holding that state taking and conversion claims are not preempted). But see
id. at 1337-38 (Harding, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state claims essentially
seek to recover for patent infringement and therefore are preempted).
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state universities. 0 4 This strategy has some advantages over misap-
propriation and inverse condemnation. First, all states recognize
breach of contract claims, whereas many do not recognize the tort of
misappropriation and others impose strict conditions on inverse con-
demnation suits. Second, the contract approach gives the intellectual
property owner flexibility to define the scope of protection without
having to squeeze into existing legal pigeonholes.10 5 Third, most
states have waived sovereign immunity to breach of contract claims
in state court.1° 6 Fourth, state contract law has a much better chance
of surviving preemption than misappropriation because a contract
binds only identifiable persons and not the world at large. 10 7 The
preemption analysis is more complicated, to be sure, but the contract
alternative should still be quite attractive.
C. Summary
This brief survey of available remedies under federal and state
law highlights two important points. First, those judicial remedies
that survive the Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity
offer less certain and more limited protection than the federal patent,
copyright, and trademark laws. The options available for enforcing
federal law against university officials/employees are riddled with
problems. Traditional state intellectual property law theories are also
quite limited, and the broader tort of misappropriation faces a sub-
stantial risk of preemption. State inverse condemnation remedies are
more promising, but they too are quite uncertain under current law.
A contract-based strategy is probably the best option since a
104. This alternative would be necessary only if contractual waiver of Elev-
enth Amendment immunity was not feasible, as waiver is superior because it
allows enforcement of federal rights. See supra notes 77-83 and accompany-
ing text.
105. This assumes that the jurisdiction's contract law gives sophisticated
parties broad latitude to define substantive rights and duties and to specify
remedies available in the event of breach. To the extent state law limits the
parties' freedom to contract, this strategy might lose some of its attractiveness.
106. Although the state defendant might still argue that the state's waiver
should not extend to contract claims that essentially duplicate federal rights.
Also, when states waive sovereign immunity to contract claims, they have the
power to funnel the suits into a special state forum, such as a court of claims.
107. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979); ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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contractual waiver or a contractual specification of exclusive rights
offers protection against the state itself comparable to federal intel-
lectual property law.
Second, the superiority of the contract strategy should encourage
firms at the margin to limit disclosure to relational settings where
contract and trade secret law can be employed. These incentives, in
turn, will encourage greater reliance on secrecy to protect against un-
controlled disclosure. As discussed at length in the following sec-
tion, this shift in strategy toward secrecy can be costly from a social
point of view.
IV. THE IMPACT AND COSTS OF STATE IMMUNITY
IN THE IP FIELD
A. The Simple Story
The critics of state immunity tell a relatively simple story about
the probable effects of a broad Eleventh Amendment in the intellec-
tual property field. 10 8  According to this story, federal and state
remedies are likely to be so weak that state officials will find it
worthwhile to infringe intellectual property rights routinely. In-
fringement may not be deliberate at first; state officials might simply
take less care in verifying ownership rights. But as the practice be-
comes more prevalent, attitudes and norms will change, eventually
making deliberate infringement an acceptable practice.
With a substantial increase in state infringement, creators who
market mostly to state agencies or institutions will earn less from
their creations and, as a result, will invest less in creative activity,
thereby dampening incentives to create. 0 9 In this way, state immu-
nity runs the risk of reproducing the perverse equilibrium of the Pris-
oner's Dilemma, in which hardly anyone creates new works or in-
ventions for fear that others will simply copy without paying. For
example, those who write and publish textbooks for schools and uni-
versities will be less inclined to do so if widespread copying deprives
108. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-282, at 8-9 (1989) (discussing the Copy-
right Remedy Clarification Act); House Patent Hearings, supra note 13, at 22,
42, 56-57, 70.
109. See, e.g., House Patent Hearings, supra note 13, at 34-39, 105.
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them of a large segment of their market. So too for those who make
films for state prisons and other institutions11 ° and those who invent
devices marketed mainly to states.
111
Furthermore, the critics argue that widespread state infringement
will chill the incentives of private firms to enter into cooperative re-
search ventures with state universities. 112 A private firm collaborat-
ing with a state university faces the risk that the university will mis-
appropriate the firm's valuable intellectual property and use it
beyond the terms of the cooperative arrangement. As a result, firms
will choose to deal with private universities instead, since private
universities do not have immunity. Not only will this cut off private
sources of research funding for state universities, but it may also lead
to less efficient collaborations-particularly if the state university
has more to offer the research venture.
B. The More Complex Story
Although superficially compelling, the simple story is incom-
plete in several important respects. In fact, it is not clear that state
universities will infringe intellectual property rights on a wholesale
basis in the absence of legal protection. There is very little empirical
data to support this prediction. Even the harshest critics of state im-
munity have difficulty finding concrete examples of state infringe-
ment,'1 3 a fact that condemned the Patent Remedy Clarification Act
in Florida Prepaid. 1
14
110. See Register's Report, supra note 10, at 7.
111. See, e.g., Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
112. See House Patent Hearings, supra note 13, at 34.
113. The critics tend to focus on the future, now that Eleventh Amendment
immunity is clearly established for the intellectual property field. See, e.g.,
145 CONG. REc. S13557 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(noting that "most states already respect intellectual property rights and will
seldom find themselves in infringement suits" but that there is still cause for
concern in the future, especially after Florida Prepaid).
114. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); see supra notes 31-33, 39, 42 and accompany-
ing text. This does not necessarily mean that states in fact rarely infringe. It
might just mean that it is extremely difficult to detect those infringements that
do occur. Nevertheless, the paucity of examples in the congressional record is
striking given the obvious incentives of the strong pro-intellectual property
lobby to find as many examples as possible.
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More importantly, the simple story is incomplete as a theoretical
matter. Among other things, it ignores the strategic dimension of the
interaction between state universities and private parties. Because
state universities expect to deal with private creators, publishers, and
distributors on a repeat basis, informal mechanisms such as reputa-
tion can substitute for legal sanctions as a deterrent to infringement.
Moreover, private parties will respond to a high risk of infringement
by changing their investment and marketing strategies. These strate-
gic responses, can generate costs of their own, even though they keep
the incidence of actual infringement in check. In equilibrium, there
might be little infringement, yet greater inefficiency in the creative
process.
1. Informal compliance mechanisms
The supporters of broad Eleventh Amendment immunity assume
that states will honor intellectual property rights without the pressure
of legal sanction.11 5 But the reasons they give for this assumption
are not convincing. 116 It is not enough to suppose that state actors
are just more law-abiding than the average citizen. 117 Although it is
conceivable that officials internalize a special role morality as gov-
ernment agents with a public trust, it is unlikely that faculty and staff
at state universities see themselves as occupying a governmental role
or feel especially obligated by virtue of holding a public office.
115. Or at least that the states, as quasi-independent sovereigns, should be
given a chance to do so before Congress abrogates their immunity. See Alden
v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2266 (1999) (relying on the "good faith of the
States" to safeguard the supremacy of federal law).
116. This assumes, of course, that the available legal remedies against offi-
cers and employees will be insufficient to deter infringement. This is a reason-
able assumption given the legal and practical obstacles to suit. Indeed,
individual liability is so difficult to establish for innocent infringement that not
many suits will be brought in those cases, and employees are not likely to be
aware of all the liability risks in any event unless the university makes a spe-
cial effort to inform them.
117. Eleventh Amendment immunity does not make appropriation any more
lawful just because it is done by the state. Prohibitions against patent and
copyright infringement retain their strength as legal norms even if they cannot
be enforced. This argument assumes, therefore, that a state official will not in-
fringe simply out of respect for the law entirely apart from any possible sanc-
tion.
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Moreover, university officials/employees will not worry much
about the morality of infringement if they believe that their use is
justified even when it is not. The intellectual property laws are suffi-
ciently open-ended to allow considerable room for this sort of mis-
take or self-delusion. For example, state university researchers eager
to move forward with a project and wishing to avoid expensive roy-
alties might not bother to check whether a particular technology is
under patent, or they might persuade themselves that their modifica-
tions are enough to avoid infringement. Similarly, in the absence of
strict university rules, teachers could easily convince themselves that
the educational mission justifies the copying of portions of articles
and books for inclusion in a course packet. Moreover, the university
bureaucracy as a whole is not likely to take affirmative steps to stop
these practices if the university itself faces no substantial risk of li-
ability for damages.
Thus, to rely on voluntary compliance, one must have a more
convincing reason for state universities to comply than simple habit
or role morality. In fact, there is such a reason, but it applies only
under certain conditions. A university should be willing to set strict
rules against infringement and police compliance if it stands to gain
substantially in the long run from not infringing intellectual property
rights in the short term.
18
To see how this works, let us assume that intellectual property
owners have no legal recourse whatsoever against state universi-
ties-not even ordinary contract or trade secret remedies. Consider a
private firm (call it "X") that is interested in selling books, licensing
a patent, transacting in some other form of intellectual property, or
entering into some kind of research collaboration with a state univer-
sity (call it "U"). Firm X knows that it has no legal remedy if the
university buys a few books and copies the rest, refuses to pay for
use of a patent after learning from the firm how to practice it
118. There may be other reasons as well. In his contribution to this Sympo-
sium, Professor Peter Menell discusses a number of different institutional con-
straints that, in his view, make the likelihood of state infringement quite low. I
focus on informal sanctions and secrecy strategies in this Article because I be-
lieve these are likely to play a central role in university-industry interaction.
However, Professor Menell is certainly correct that there are other institutional
factors that discourage infringement.
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efficiently, or appropriates-and even publicly discloses-firm se-
crets revealed in ajoint venture.
What will firm X do under these circumstances? Suppose X has
a choice between transacting with U or transacting with a private
university that does not have immunity. If the firm can estimate its
expected future loss from U's possible infiingement, the firm can
demand a higher payment from U to compensate for that loss. If U is
willing to pay this higher price, then X and U can enter into the
transaction.
U's immunity, however, creates problems. If the expected loss
to firm X is substantially higher than the expected gain to U from
appropriation, then U might not be willing to pay X's price, and no
deal would be possible. For example, revealing information to U's
researchers in the absence of legal protection increases the risk that
the information will spread to X's competitors and others not associ-
ated with U. Firm X will demand a higher price to compensate for
this additional risk, but U might not be willing to pay that higher
price if it cannot internalize all the benefits of this uncontrolled dif-
fusion.
Furthermore, valuing intellectual property is notoriously diffi-
cult, partly due to the uncertainty associated with predicting future
uses.1 19 If X cannot rely on legal remedies to limit future use by U,
then X must anticipate all possible uses-a task that makes X's
valuation problem and expected loss calculations particularly com-
plicated. Given these complexities, X might prefer to transact with a
private university instead. 1
20
Suppose these obstacles are serious enough so that firms like X
would systematically shun state universities in favor of private insti-
tutions. Under these circumstances, state universities would be bet-
ter off if they could make credible commitments to respect
119. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellec-
tual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1048-50, 1053, 1055 (1997) (dis-
cussing valuation problems for intellectual property).
120. These incentives depend of course on the profitability of transacting
with U and on X's beliefs about the likelihood that U will in fact infringe. For
example, if U had a much larger student body than the average private univer-
sity, or had superior research capabilities, and X believed that U was not very
likely to infringe, then X might find it more profitable to transact with U de-
spite the additional uncertainty.
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intellectual property rights. To be sure, this is not true for all trans-
actions. For example, a university that cannot buy books from a
publisher might be able to acquire copies elsewhere-from private
university bookstores perhaps-and simply copy the copies. As long
as the search costs of locating the first copy are not too high, the uni-
versity would be better off infringing, and as a result would have no
interest in committing to noninfringement just to be able to buy from
the publisher. However, there are many situations where universities
would want to make credible commitments to respect intellectual
property rights if only they could.'
21
The problem for the university is that it cannot credibly commit
in advance. No matter how strongly U promises before the transac-
tion not to infringe, it will have powerful incentives as a rational ac-
tor to break its promise once it has access to X's intellectual prop-
erty. X is aware of U's incentives, so X will not credit U's promise.
If intellectual property laws could be enforced against U, then the
threat of legal sanction would make U's commitment credible, but
we have assumed that immunity makes enforcement impossible.1
22
It is well known in the game theory literature that parties can
solve these commitment problems if they engage in repeated interac-
tion.123 State universities repeatedly transact with intellectual prop-
erty owners and with private firms interested in entering into re-
search collaborations, and there is no definite end to these
transactions. Under these circumstances, private firms like X can
121. Although the university can learn patented technology from the Patent
Office filing, it can acquire the know-how necessary to practice the patent effi-
ciently only from the firm.
122. One might wonder why under these circumstances state universities do
not simply lobby the state legislature to abrogate their immunity. One reason
might be that they do not want to forego the benefits of being able to infringe,
or perhaps they see no need for a political solution because informal mecha-
nisms do an adequate job of supporting credible commitments. In addition,
public choice problems can frustrate political solutions of this kind.
123. See, e.g., ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 121-31, 154-56 (1989). There is also a vo-
luminous legal literature discussing the creation and enforcement of informal
norms that relies in large part on iterated, repeat play games. Indeed, my point
can be recast in terms of norm creation. I argue, in effect, that a noninfringe-
ment norm is likely to evolve in the repeat play environment of university-
industry interaction.
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induce state universities like U to comply with intellectual property
laws by threatening never to deal with the university again if it in-
fringes once. 124 Provided the university does not discount the future
too much, it will never infringe because the long-term cost of losing
all future transactions will be greater than the short-term benefit of
cheating in a particular case.
Reputation mechanisms can also bond credible commitments
not to infringe.125 State universities should have incentives to de-
velop and maintain reputations for respecting intellectual property
rights. Suppose firm X believes that some state universities prefer
not to infringe, but does not know whether U is one of those nonin-
fringing types. Under these circumstances, U might try to establish a
reputation as a noninfringing type in order to acquire the benefits of
engaging in transactions with X at a lower cost. U builds its reputa-
tion by paying X's higher price at first, when X does not know
whether U will infringe, and then foregoing the temptation to in-
fringe ex post. So long as U can build reputation capital in this way
and expects to lose much of that capital if it cheats, reputation can
serve as a bonding mechanism and make U's commitment credible in
the absence of law.
These rosy scenarios depend on a number of conditions. For
example, it seems reasonable, though hardly certain, that firms will
tend to favor private universities when state universities systemati-
cally infringe. Moreover, the number of state universities and private
firms interested in transacting is probably small enough to assure that
information about cheating is widely distributed.
126
124. This is the so-called "Grim Strategy," and it is not the only strategy that
can work. See id. at 123-25.
125. Technically, a reputation mechanism works even when the number of
interactions has a definite and known end. For indefinitely repeated games, it
is the threat of informal sanction that induces compliance; for reputation
games, it is the benefit of reputational bonding and the cost of losing reputation
capital. See id. at 121-3 1.
126. Assuming that information is effectively distributed throughout the
market, reputation mechanisms might also help with compliance in those
situations, like the textbook copying example, where the university is other-
wise better off being able to infringe. Firms are not likely to make fine dis-
tinctions among different infringement cases, so that a university can be sure of
preserving its reputation capital when it matters only if it resists the temptation
to infringe in all cases.
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However, informal sanctions and reputation work well only to
the extent that cheating is easy to detect. In our case, this means that
the legal definition of infringement must be clear enough so that any
instance of infringement can be easily observed and characterized as
such without disagreement. But the patent, copyright, and trademark
laws are hardly this clear cut. For example, substantial similarity
127
and fair use 128 standards in copyright law are sufficiently opaque to
defy objective application. Moreover, reasonable minds can disagree
about whether an invention is sufficiently similar to a patent to in-
fringe 129 or whether likelihood of confusion exists to support trade-
mark infringement. 130  It is possible, therefore, that a university
might reasonably believe that its actions do not constitute infringe-
ment while a firm reasonably believes the opposite. This potential
for uncertainty and disagreement undermines the threat value of in-
formal sanctions and the ability of universities to build and preserve
favorable reputations.
2. Strategic responses to infringement risks
Thus, we cannot be certain that informal mechanisms will deter
all infringement by state universities. Let us assume then that infor-
mal mechanisms work imperfectly, so a substantial risk of infringe-
ment remains. Firms like X will respond by adjusting their behavior
to manage the risk in a way that maximizes the firm's profits. An-
ticipating these strategic responses is crucial to predicting the fre-
quency of infringement and the social costs of state immunity.
One possible response is for firms to shun state universities al-
together and deal only with private institutions. The threat to do so
supported the optimal compliance equilibrium in the previous sec-
tion. If that equilibrium cannot be sustained, it seems reasonable to
127. See ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE
NINETIES 425 (1993) (stating a "lack of uniformity prevails in judicial applica-
tion of the substantial similarity test").
128. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see also supra note 60 and accompanying
text.
129. See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 44
(1997) (deciding not to "micro-manag[e] the Federal Circuit's particular word-
choice for analyzing equivalence," leaving the formulation of equivalence to
evolve on a case-by-case basis).
130. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000).
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suppose that firms will transact with private universities more fre-
quently.
Even so, it is extremely unlikely that firms will deal with private
universities exclusively. The business opportunities at state univer-
sities are simply too lucrative to pass up all the time. For example,
many state universities with large student bodies offer huge potential
markets for books and other copyrighted course materials. Moreo-
ver, preeminent state research institutions, like the University of
California at Berkeley, have top-notch professors, high quality
graduate students, and first-rate facilities that make them extremely
attractive prospects for joint research ventures and licensing oppor-
tunities.'
Thus, one would expect private firms to devise strategies that
reduce the risk of infringement and make it economically feasible to
transact with state universities some of the time. One such strategy
is to keep valuable intellectual property secret and to contract for le-
gal protection. In Part III above, we saw how a contract might be
used to extract an enforceable waiver of Eleventh Amendment im-
munity or an enforceable promise not to infringe. 132 Once the firm
obtains the waiver or promise, it can disclose its intellectual property
to the university, confident that it has legal protection similar to that
against private institutions.
Insofar as this secrecy strategy is attractive, it will encourage a
greater number of firms to keep more of their information secret for
longer periods of time. For example, firm X that has developed a
new and patentable genetic engineering technology might choose se-
crecy over patent protection if X anticipates a future joint venture
with a state university aimed at investigating new applications for the
technology. 3 3 Similarly, if X anticipates a research collaboration to
develop a computer program, it might be inclined to keep the
131. See Baldwin, supra note 1, at 633-37 (showing that at least 19 of the top
33 universities in terms of private industry research support are state institu-
tions).
132. See supra notes 77-83, 104-07 and accompanying text.
133. Patent and trade secret are mutually exclusive alternatives. To obtain a
patent, the firm must disclose its invention to the public, which eliminates any
claim to secrecy. Alternatively, the firm might try to keep the information se-
cret until it negotiates the contract with the university and then seek a patent if
it is not barred by 35 U.S.C. § 102. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), (g) (1994).
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program secret until the collaboration is finalized. So too for sales of
textbooks to state universities. Without copyright protection, firm X
might delay publication and keep the book secret until it is able to
negotiate sales contracts-ideally long-term contracts-with at least
the largest state institutions.
Secrecy is also likely to become more important with respect to
the creative products of a joint venture or research collaboration. If
X fears that state universities other than U will appropriate the prod-
ucts of the X-U collaboration, X will be inclined to insist on secrecy
for a longer period of time. This is especially true if the research re-
sults could be the basis for future collaborations with state universi-
ties other than U. Because secrecy enhances the value X obtains
from the collaboration, X should be willing to pay more for secrecy,
and therefore U has an incentive to agree to those terms.
The problem with a secrecy strategy from a public policy per-
spective is that it can produce high costs.1 34 For instance, secrecy
prevents others from learning the ideas and improving on them. It
also encourages wasteful duplication of research effort by withhold-
ing knowledge that the race to invent has been won. Moreover, se-
crecy can artificially skew research incentives toward inventions that
are difficult to reverse engineer, such as processes or methods that
can be commercially exploited while hidden from public view.
These effects are especially troubling in the case of patentable in-
ventions, such as genetic engineering technology, because secrecy
frustrates the strong federal patent policy favoring early public dis-
closure of valuable inventions.
135
In addition, a secrecy strategy can substantially increase the
transaction costs of negotiating a contract between firm X and uni-
versity U.136 Information has the property of nonexcludability: it is
difficult for the owner of information to exclude others from access
to it. Once someone is exposed to information, there is no way to
force that person to unlearn it. This nonexcludability property
makes it especially difficult to negotiate contracts that involve
134. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 87, at 264-81 (analyzing the costs of se-
crecy).
135. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
136. See, e.g., Steven N. S. Cheung, Property Rights in Trade Secrets, 20
ECON. INQUIRY 40, 44-45 (1982).
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information transfers because of a problem commonly known as Ar-
row's Information Paradox.
137
To illustrate, suppose firm X and university U are discussing the
possibility of a research collaboration to develop applications of X's
new genetic engineering technology. 138  Typically, such arrange-
ments require that the firm contribute information, funding, and per-
sonnel in return for exclusive licenses to any new technology that re-
sults from the venture. Suppose X is competing with other firms for
the opportunity to work with U's top-notch research faculty. U be-
lieves that the success of any joint venture with X depends critically
on the quality of X's genetic engineering technology, and X under-
stands that this is the main reason for U's interest. Given that U has
other options, U insists on studying X's technology in detail so that it
can value the contract before agreeing to any terms. But worried that
U will just take the technology, X insists that U first give a waiver or
contractual promise. U, however, refuses to agree out of concern
that doing so will open it up to potential lawsuits if it does not con-
clude a deal with X and develops and uses the same technology in-
dependently.
139
Thus, the parties can end up in a stalemate because of the
asymmetric information and resulting transaction costs associated
with the transfer of intellectual property.140 U cannot value the bene-
fits of the contract without inspecting the technology, but X fears that
U will just take the technology without entering into the contract-or
at least insist on a higher price. Patent and copyright solve this
137. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Re-
sources for Invention, in TH RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIvITY:
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614-16 (1962).
138. This example assumes that X has private information about its technol-
ogy that U needs to know in order to value the contract accurately. Of course,
it can also work the other way. U might have private information about its re-
search capabilities or unpublished research results that X would like to know.
However, U does not have to worry about immunity obstacles to protecting its
intellectual property when it shares that property with X.
139. U may also be concerned about potential lawsuits if it ends up in some
kind of collaboration with another firm that developed the same technology in-
dependently.
140. There is evidence that disputes about intellectual property rights already
create significant obstacles to negotiating joint ventures successfully. See, e.g.,
Blumenthal et al., supra note 22, at 370.
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problem by preventing appropriation after inspection without the
need for waiver or contractual promise. By undermining the effec-
tiveness of the copyright and patent solution, broad state immunity
can result in fewer mutually beneficial joint ventures or collabora-
tions between private industry and state universities.
Secrecy also creates special problems unique to the university
setting. The more secrecy is used as a strategy for protecting intel-
lectual property, the more stringent the constraints are likely to be on
faculty publication of research results. Many commentators are al-
ready concerned about the adverse impact of secrecy on traditional
academic values of openness and publicity and on the university's
scholarly commitment to advancing public knowledge. 141 Empirical
studies indicate that firms involved in research collaborations with
universities today frequently insist on disclosure restrictions that last
much longer than the time necessary to file for a patent. 142 Increased
reliance on secrecy will only exacerbate these problems.
Immunity can also affect the kinds of relationships private firms
enter into with state universities. Firms today are not always moti-
vated to enter research collaborations by the prospect of acquiring
specific intellectual property assets for later commercial exploitation.
Frequently, they are more interested in getting access to cutting edge
ideas and talented graduate students for future employment. 143 Rela-
tionships of this kind should be easier to negotiate, at least insofar as
Arrow's Paradox is concerned, and could become more frequent with
immunity obstacles to suit. For example, a joint venture that focuses
on funding basic research rather than targeting specific applications
can give firms access to new ideas and talented graduate students
141. See, e.g., Blumenthal et al., supra note 22, at 371-72 (noting that "se-
crecy is more common in industrially supported research [in the life sciences]
than in research supported otherwise" and includes information of value to
academic colleagues, "including those useful in repeating and confirming the
work."); see also Florida, supra note 1, 33 (expressing concerns about "dis-
closure restrictions" that serve the interests of private firms but withhold valu-
able information from the public domain).
142. The motivation is often to protect secret know-how or experimental
methods from disclosure. See, e.g., Blumenthal et al., supra note 22, at 371-72
(presenting statistics).
143. See House Science Policy Hearings, supra note 22, 22; Blumenthal et
al., supra note 22, at 370.
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without the need to disclose specific firm technology and without the
high transaction costs of negotiating intellectual property rights.
The social impact of a shift in industry-university cooperation
away from applied research and toward basic research is difficult to
determine. There are social benefits to enhanced private funding of
basic research, but there are also social costs to creating disincentives
for private industry-university cooperation in the development of
useful applications.
State immunity can generate other costs as well. For example,
since state law holds out the best hope for legal protection, firms
dealing with state universities will have to become familiar with the
substantive intellectual property, contract, and immunity law of all
the different states in which they transact. This increases search and
information costs, and it also increases litigation costs by inviting
disputes over the choice of state law to apply.
Finally, state university immunity from declaratory judgment
actions can create special costs for the patent system. If a state uni-
versity does not have to worry about being sued for a declaration of
patent invalidity, it might be more inclined to stretch the limits of
patent by seeking excessively broad patents over basic research re-
sults, such as gene fragments and sequences.1 44 Any such applica-
tion would have to survive a patent examiner's scrutiny, of course,
but there is reason to believe that the patent examination process is
plagued by a substantial risk of error and that the error is skewed in
the direction of patent grants. 14 5 Without judicial error correction in
later declaratory judgment suits, there could be a greater number of
excessively broad or otherwise erroneously granted patents held by
state universities. 14 6  Excessively broad patent monopolies create
144. See generally Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellec-
tual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77 (1999)
(noting the increased propensity of universities to patent results, such as gene
fragments, that are very close to fundamental research).
145. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before
Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform,
14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 589-91 (1999) (discussing this error risk in the
context of software patents).
146. State universities are not completely immune from judicial scrutiny of
patent validity. If a state university sues for infringement in federal court, the
defendant can raise the defense of patent invalidity in that suit. And a judicial
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deadweight loss, impede diffusion and further innovation, and raise
transaction costs by increasing reliance on licensing.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
This analysis of the effects of state immunity is only suggestive
and admittedly quite speculative. Much more empirical evidence is
needed before any predictions can be made with confidence. But the
analysis suggests directions for empirical research and, if confirmed,
has important implications for a proper understanding of the costs of
immunity in the intellectual property field.
First, critics should not blithely assume that the Supreme
Court's broad approach to the Eleventh Amendment risks wide-
spread infringement by state universities. Reputation or informal
sanctions can provide nonlegal inducements to compliance in many
situations. In this regard, it would be helpful to have more empirical
research into the reasons why universities honor intellectual property
rights, when they do, and the presence of factors in the university
setting that support the development of reputation markets, such as
mechanisms for wide diffusion of reputational information.
Second, supporters of a broad approach to Eleventh Amendment
immunity should not infer state compliance with intellectual property
laws from a sparse record of state infringement. Even rare cases of
actual infringement can support credible threats strong enough to in-
duce firms to take strategic countermeasures, such as increased reli-
ance on secrecy and contract, and to shift research agendas and goals
for university joint ventures. These countermeasures, in turn, can be
costly even if they keep the frequency of actual infringement quite
low. These indirect costs are much more difficult to measure than
direct infringements, but they are at least as important to an
determination of patent invalidity might bind the university in future infringe-
ment suits through the operation of nonmutual collateral estoppel-provided
nonmutual collateral estoppel in this context is consistent with the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found.,
402 U.S. 313 (1971) (holding under the doctrine of collateral estoppel that a
patentee whose patent is held invalid in his suit against one alleged infringer
may be precluded from asserting the validity of the patent against another al-
leged infringer). Thus, the effect is a marginal one. The lack of a declaratory
judgment action incrementally reduces firm incentives to use the patented in-
vention but does not eliminate those incentives altogether.
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understanding of the policy stakes. Again, this analysis has implica-
tions for empirical research insofar as it highlights the importance of
knowing more about the effectiveness of firm strategies.
Even the existence of substantial strategic costs does not neces-
sarily mean that broad interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment
are bad as a policy matter. That conclusion depends on the benefits
of state immunity, which supporters claim include respect for the
dignity of states as quasi-independent sovereigns, preservation of
state and federal political accountability, and safeguarding of state
fiscal resources. 147
But if broad Eleventh Amendment immunity is bad policy, an
important lesson of this Article is that Congress's options in dealing
with it might be more limited than commonly supposed. If immu-
nity's costs are manifested not in actual infringement but in strategic
maneuvering to minimize infringement risks, then there might never
be the sort of evidence of widespread infringement that the Court re-
quires as a condition for outright congressional abrogation of immu-
nity.1 48 To be sure, this Article analyzes the effects of immunity only
in the repeat play environment of university-industry interaction,
leaving the possibility that states will infringe sufficiently often in
nonuniversity settings to support congressional abrogation across the
board. Yet states rely on repeat business with private intellectual
property firms frequently enough in settings outside of the university
that the predictions of this Article are likely to hold more gener-
ally. 149
If the costs of immunity are felt in ways other than infringement,
then Congress will have to respond in ways other than abrogation. In
particular, Congress will have to proceed indirectly, perhaps by at-
taching waiver conditions to federal research grants, expanding the
statutory liability of state employees for federal intellectual property
infringement, or curtailing the qualified immunity defense. None of
147. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2263-66 (1999).
148. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting that the Supreme
Court requires a pervasive and widespread pattern of state infringement before
Congress can exercise its power to abrogate under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
149. In addition, Professor Peter Menell, in his contribution to this sympo-
sium, identifies a number of institutional constraints that could mitigate the
risk of infringement in nonuniversity settings.
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these options is as effective as outright abrogation. Thus, the most
serious consequence of the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurispru-
dence is that it might hinder the federal government's efforts to deal
with a nationally important segment of intellectual property policy.
Whatever the normative and legal implications, however, one
thing is certain. Any serious analysis of the Eleventh Amendment's
impact on university-industry relations in the intellectual property
field must begin with a rigorous understanding of the factual settings
and strategic dynamics involved. This Article will have succeeded if
it has helped to advance that understanding.
